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1 Introduction
The e↵ect of health insurance on health care utilization among young adults in the United States is
an understudied area. Instead, studies have focused on healthcare utilization of other demographics.
Studies have examined the e↵ects of health insurance on health care utilization for the poor and
near-poor, those near the medicare enrollment age and the general population, including young
adults but no more current evidence on the behavior of young adults in regards to health insurance
and utilization exists. This type of research is hampered by endogeneity, in this case that health
insurance status and health care utilization covary. This can be in part due to adverse selection,
which arises when there is asymmetric information in the market place. For example, an individual
may have better knowledge of their own health than the insurer and use that information to
decide how much insurance to get. Moral hazard is another possible issue that can contribute to
endogeneity issues, where an individual utilizes more medical services as a result of being insured.
It is important to analyze the e↵ect of health insurance and utilization on expenditure because
high out of pocket healthcare expenditure has been shown to have an adverse e↵ect on access
to healthcare (Karaca-Mandic et al., 2014). Furthermore, in real terms, the cost for healthcare
increased between 1999 and 2009 resulting in an increase of $95 in monthly income to devote to
non-health spending rather than an increase of $545 (Auerbach and Kellermann, 2011).
The dependent care provision of the Patient Protection and A↵ordable Care Act (ACA) went
into e↵ect September 23, 2010. This provision allowed children to stay on their parents’ private
health care insurance until the age 26; and removed restrictions based on marriage, dependency,
residency, and student status which had previously varied at the state level. Previous research has
shown that there was an increase in insurance coverage rates resulting from this legislation in the
target demographic (19-26 year olds) (Barbaresco et al., 2015; Cantor et al., 2012a). The policy
change allows for the examination of the e↵ect of health insurance on health related outcomes and
expenditure; using the law change as an exogenous shock, it can be used as a natural experiment.
Using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), a di↵erence-in-di↵erence approach
using a two-part model can be used to examine expenditure outcomes. However, this is a naive
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model due to the endogenous relationship between health insurance status and health care utiliza-
tion. For this reason this paper expands upon that set-up, using a two stage residual inclusion
model, or control function, to examine expenditure outcomes. The age groups for this paper are
21-25 year olds and 26-29 year olds. Data from 2008-2010 is before the policy change, while data
from 2011-2012 denote periods after the ACA went into e↵ect.
The following section details the available previous literature that this paper builds upon. Sec-
tion 3 describes the data and model that is utilized for this study. The paper continues with the
results in Section 4 and concludes with discussion of the results in Section 5.
2 Literature Review
The literature review is organized into two sections, notable previous insurance literature and
literature related to the A↵ordable Care Act. A broad overview of past major insurance research
is provided in section 2.1. The A↵ordable Care Act literature is discussed in section 2.2, and is
further divided into two subsets, dependent coverage expansion and expenditure e↵ects.
2.1 Notable Previous Insurance Literature
There are three formative papers that exploit random variation in health care coverage to examine
the e↵ects of health insurance on di↵erent groups. The first had the benefit of being a federally
funded experiment. Manning et al. (1987) reported findings from the Rand Health Insurance
Experiment (HIE). The HIE was initiated by the federal government in 1974 and was intended
to examine many issues including; whether the demand response for public insurance is di↵erent
for the poor, whether insurance elasticities vary by type of medical procedure, how the change
in consumption of medical services at the margin a↵ects health, and to examine whether lower
expenditures in Health Maintenance Organizations were due to selection of healthier members or
more e cient treatment. The HIE took place between 1974 and 1977, and enrolled families from
selected areas of the United States. There were fourteen categories of fee-for-service insurance or
prepaid group insurance that the families could be enrolled into. Families were assigned to one of
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these programs using the Finite Selection Model. Using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) they found
that per capita expenses were 45% higher on plans with no out of pocket costs than plans with
95% coinsurance rates (that were subject to an upper limit on out of pocket expenses). They found
that plans with intermediate cost-sharing had spending rates between those two extremes. The
di↵erences in cost sharing a↵ected the number of contacts more than the intensity of the contacts.
The largest di↵erence for outpatient services occurred between the free and 25% plans. Using the
four equation model, they found that mean predicted expenditure was 46% higher for the free plans
(compared to 45% for ANOVA). The second, Card et al. (2009), used a reduced-form regression
discontinuity model to examine the e↵ect of Medicare using the change of insurance status at the
age 65 Medicare eligibility threshold. They used data from 1992-2002 from hospitals which are
regulated by the state of California. They found that Medicare has a small significant positive
e↵ect on intensity of treatment at age 65 and a decrease in the mortality rate. The third employed
a lottery that was used to determine which uninsured low income adults would be allowed to apply
to Medicaid in Oregon. Finkelstein et al. (2012) used this lottery in a randomized controlled design
setup in order to examine the e↵ect of increasing access to public health insurance. Specifically, they
looked at the e↵ect it had on health care utilization, health outcomes, and the financial e↵ects on low
income persons after one year by using lottery selection as an instrument for insurance coverage.
The lottery was available to 90,000 persons who signed up to be on a waiting list for Oregon’s
Medicaid program. They found that insurance coverage, instrumented by the lottery selection,
was associated with increases in the likelihoods of having a hospital admission, taking prescription
drugs and having an outpatient visit. They were unable to reject the null that emergency room
utilization was unchanged. In addition, they found that insurance results in a decrease of exposure
to medical liabilities and out of pocket medical expenses. From the survey they find that having
Medicaid is associated with an increase in self-reported health.
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2.2 The A↵ordable Care Act
2.2.1 Dependent Coverage Expansion
Several papers have examined the e↵ect of dependent coverage mandate. Using the Current Pop-
ulation Survey’s Annual Demographic Supplement for the year 2000-2008, Monheit et al. (2011)
examined state level dependent care coverage expansion that took place prior to the enactment of
the A↵ordable Care Act provision using linear probability models in a di↵erence-in-di↵erence ap-
proach. The treatment group was composed of 19-25 year olds who resided with their parents and
the control group included 26-29 year olds. In the 19 early adopting states examined, they found
dependent coverage increased between 1.52 and 3.84 percentage points for persons aged 19-25 who
lived with their parents. However, no significant results were found for changes in the uninsured
rate and the increases in dependent coverage were partially o↵set by decreases in employer spon-
sored insurance. Blum et al. (2012) also used a di↵erence-in-di↵erence approach to examine state
level dependent coverage expansion. They utilized Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System data
from 2002-2004 and 2008-2009 (treatment group: 19-23 year olds in states that enacted dependent
coverage expansion laws in 2005 or 2006, control group: 19-23 year olds in states that did not
expand). They found that the states with the expansion had larger increases in health insurance.
They also found larger increases in personal physician identification, recent physical exams and de-
creases in foregone care due to cost in the states with dependent care coverage expansion. Cantor
et al. (2012a), Sommers et al. (2013), and Barbaresco et al. (2015) all used a di↵erence-in-di↵erence
approach to examine the e↵ect of the dependent care provision on having insurance. Although the
ages vary slightly, these studies compared treatment (approximately ages 19-25) and control (ages
26-30) groups before and after the implementation of the policy. These studies found that insurance
rates among the treated group increased more than in the control groups. This paper finds similar
shifts in insurance designations. Cantor et al. (2012b) used the Current Population Survey (years
2004-2010) and a di↵erence-in-di↵erence framework to examine the interaction between state level
dependent care expansion and the ACA dependent care provision. Examining a series of multivari-
ate linear probability models, they find that states that had prior dependent coverage expansion
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had a higher rate of insurance pick up than states without previous expansion. Unlike previous
analysis of state level expansion, they do not find that the increase in dependent coverage was o↵set
by a decrease in employer sponsored insurance.
2.2.2 Expenditure E↵ects
The research on the expenditure e↵ects of the A↵ordable Care Act dependent care provision is
limited. Busch, Golberstein and Meara (2014) Busch et al. (2014) used a di↵erences-in-di↵erences
approach to examine the dependent care provisions e↵ect on high out of pocket expenses for the years
2007-2011 with data from MEPS. The years 2007-2009 were the reference period for the analysis.
The treatment group included persons aged 19-25 and the control group included persons aged
26-29. They found a net -2.4 percentage point di↵erence between the treatment and control groups
relative to the reference time period on the proportion of persons with out of pocket expenditures
greater than $1,500. Similarly, they found a net di↵erence of -4.4 percentage points for out of pocket
expenditures greater than $500. Clemans-Cope et al. (2013) used MEPS data from the years 2003-
2009 to analyze the e↵ect the A↵ordable Care Act would have on uninsured adults, through the
expansion of the Medicaid program. Specifically examining two subsets of the population, persons
with chronic conditions and persons with mental health conditions, they analyzed the e↵ect of
having Medicaid on usage and expenditure. To estimate expenditures, they utilized a two-part
generalized linear model, with a logistic regression for the first part and a gamma regression model
with a log link as the second part. For both low income persons with chronic conditions and low
income persons with mental health conditions, they found individuals on Medicaid have higher
total usage and healthcare expenditure (excluding out of pocket costs). Next, they projected the
e↵ect of the A↵ordable Care Act Medicaid expansion. They projected that total per capita health
care expenditure (excluding out of pocket costs) would increase $3693 for persons who become
eligible for Medicaid after previously being uninsured. For these same individuals, out of pocket
expenditure is projected to decrease to $921.
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3 Methods
3.1 Data
The publicly available Household Component of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
from the years 2008-2012 was used. The Medical Expenditure Panel survey was first conducted in
1996 and contains data from families and individuals, medical providers, and employers. MEPS
has data on Americans health service usage, the cost of health services, the manner in which
the health services are paid for and the state of health insurance available to U.S. workers. The
data include approximately 21,000 observations with about 19,000 observations included in the
regression analysis. Entropy balancing is used to create a balanced sample. This paper uses
expenditure variables as the dependent variables. They include total expenditure, total amount paid
by self/family, o ce based visits self/family amount, inpatient hospital stays self/family amount,
and emergency room self/family amount. The main variable of interest is the type of insurance
coverage, which is broken into three categories: private, public and uninsured. In this paper,
approximately 58% of people are privately insured, 13% only have public insurance, and 29% are
uninsured. Control variables include family income level, education level, region, metropolitan
statistical areas, instrumental activities of daily living (IADL), activities of daily living limitations
(ADL), age and dummy variables for race, marital status, the year, and gender. Less than 15%
of persons in the sample had less than a grade 12 level of education when they entered MEPS.
Approximately 1% of persons responded yes to the IADL screener question and fewer than .5%
of persons responded yes to the ADL screener question. For these analyses, age is restricted to
persons between the age of 21-29. Table 4 shows age demographics. Approximately 14% of persons
are Black, 5% are Asian, and 21% are Hispanic in the sample. Only 17% of persons are married
within the sample. The sample has an even gender split. Tables 2 and 3 show summary statistics
for the dependent and independent variables.
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3.2 Model Specification
Two stage least squares using instrumental variables may be used in cases of endogeneity. In two
stage least squares, an additional regressor, that does not directly a↵ect the dependent variable,
is used to better capture the e↵ect that endogenous independent variables have on the dependent
variable. The instrument should capture the e↵ects on the dependent variable of shifts in the
endogenous independent variable due to the instrument. In the first stage, the endogenous regressor
is regressed on all the exogenous variables using the ordinary least squares method (OLS). The
resulting predicted value is then included as an additional regressor in the original regression of
interest. When a non-linear model may be better suited for estimation, a two stage residual inclusion
approach, also known as a control function, may be utilized. The control function method utilizes
residuals from a first stage estimation as additional regressors in the second stage. In cases of
linearity, this is the same e↵ect as two stage least squares. Terza, Basu and Rathouz (2008) suggest
that this is a possible technique to mitigate the e↵ect of endogeneity and demonstrate that this
approach is consistent by using a simulation study and re-estimating Mullahy (1997) study on
models of cigarette smoking behavior. This paper uses a control function approach which utilizes
a di↵erence-in-di↵erence multinomial logit first stage.
The di↵erence-in-di↵erence examination utilizes the change in policy that occurred with the
enactment of the ACA dependent care provision. The di↵erence-in-di↵erence is specified with a
treatment group of 21-25 year olds and a control group of 26-29 year olds, and split between pre-
implementation and post policy implementation. Table 1 shows how the di↵erence-in-di↵erence is
specified. The main variable of interest in this regression is the interaction term (in the treatment
group and after the policy went into e↵ect) which is significant. A multinomial logit model is used
to predict the likelihood of having private or public insurance, with the base level being uninsured.
The interaction term (in the treatment group and after the policy went into e↵ect) from this stage
is used as the instrument for the control function analysis. Residuals are generated to be included
as additional regressors for the control function examination.
Previous health-related literature has suggested the use of the two-part model in cases with a
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high percentage of observed zeroes in the data (in healthcare this is often due to zero usage of
health services). For this reason, a two-part model is used for the second block of the control
function. The two-part model breaks the process of utilizing medical services into two parts. The
first part accounts for the decision making process of utilizing a medical service (and consequently
incurring a positive expense), and the second part examines the level of expense incurred (Duan
et al., 1983). The two-part model can be used to show a combined overall e↵ect. The first part
of the two-part model is a logit model and the second part is a generalized linear model with
gamma log link to account for skewness. The dependent variable is an expenditure variable and the
independent variables include family income level, education level, region, metropolitan statistical
areas, instrumental activities of daily living (IADL), activities of daily living limitations (ADL),
age and dummy variables for race, marital status, the year, and gender. The generated residuals
and endogenous variable (insurance) are included in the two-part model for the control function
examination. Binary variables for year and ages are included. The interaction term is the only
excluded variable.
4 Results
In this section all reported results are relative to the base of being uninsured. The first results
reported are the likelihoods of having di↵erent types of insurance from a multinomial logit model.
Section 5.1 discusses results from the analysis where insurance status is assumed to be exogenous.
Results utilizing the control function approach are reported in Section 5.2. The results for the
multinomial logit regression are reported in Table 5. Table 6 reports the results for total expenditure
and total out-of-pocket expenditure. The results for the analysis of the emergency room, o ce based
visits and inpatient hospital stays out-of-pocket expenditures are reported in Table 7.
The results from the first stage multinomial logit regression are reported in Table 5. Results
show that being in the treatment group makes one 1.42 times as likely to have private insurance (p
< 0.01). Being in the interaction group makes one 1.478 times more likely to be privately insured (p
< 0.001). Being in the treatment or interaction cohort does not make one statistically more likely
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to have only public insurance. Women are 1.347 times more likely to have private insurance (p <
0.001) and 4.794 times more likely to be publicly insured (p < 0.001). Married persons are 1.736
times more likely to be privately insured (p < 0.001). Black persons are 0.61 times as likely to have
private insurance (p < 0.001) and 1.833 times more likely to be publicly insured (p < 0.001). Asian
persons are 0.581 times as likely to be privately insured (p < 0.001). Hispanic persons are 0.346
times as likely to be privately insured (p < 0.001) and 0.702 times as likely to be publicly insured
(p < 0.001). Persons with higher incomes are more likely to have private insurance and less likely
to have public insurance. Persons with more education are more likely to be privately insured (p
< 0.001) and less likely to be publicly insured (p < 0.001).
4.1 Naive Model
The results for total expenditure are reported in Table 6. When examining total expenditure, the
analysis in which insurance status is assumed to be exogenous yields that having private insurance
makes one 22 percentage points more likely to have non-zero total expenditure (p < 0.001). The
second stage shows an increase of $1053.2 (p <0.001) and an overall e↵ect of $1119.7 (p<0.001).
The e↵ect of having public insurance makes an individual 24.3 percentage points (p <0.001) more
likely to have non-zero expenditure. The second stage shows an increase of $3154.5 (p <0.001).
Overall the e↵ect of having public insurance is $2793.5 (p < 0.001).
The e↵ects of each type of insurance on the total out of pocket expenditure are reported in
table 6. Having private insurance makes one 20.2 percentage points (p < 0.001) more likely to have
non-zero out of pocket expenditure. The second stage yields a decrease of $186.5 (p < 0.001) and
a significant overall e↵ect is not found. Having public insurance makes one 5.99 percentage points
(p < 0.001) more likely to have non-zero expenditure. The second stage shows a decrease of $321.5
(p < 0.001) and the overall e↵ect is a decrease of $131.1 (p < 0.001).
The emergency room self/family amount figures are reported in Table 7. The e↵ect of having
private insurance does not yield a significant first stage result. The second stage results show a
decrease of $286.8 (p < 0.001) and the overall e↵ect shows a $20.43 (p < 0.001) decrease. The e↵ect
of having public insurance on the emergency room self/family amount makes one 2.81 percentage
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points (p < 0.001) less likely to have non-zero expenditure, while the second stage shows a decrease
of $284.9 (p < 0.001) and an overall e↵ect yields a decrease of $27.83 (p < 0.001).
The results for the o ce based visits self/family amount are reported in Table 7. Privately, the
first part of the two-part model shows a 21.0 percentage point (p < 0.001) increase in the likelihood
of having non-zero expenditure for the o ce based visits self/family amount. The second stage
shows a decrease of $99.20 (p < 0.01). A significant result is not found for the overall e↵ect. The
first stage e↵ects of having public insurance on the o ce based visits self/family amount show a
7.03 percentage point (p < 0.001) decrease in the likelihood of having non-zero expenditure in this
category. The only other significant result for the e↵ect of having public insurance on the o ce
based visits self/family amount is an overall decrease of $32.54 (p < 0.05).
Table 7 shows the e↵ect of having insurance on the inpatient hospital stays self/family amount.
The only significant result is a first stage 1.24 percentage point (p < 0.001) increase in the likelihood
of having non-zero expenditure from having private insurance.
In summation, using this framework, relative to being uninsured, having insurance increases
the likelihood of having non-zero total expenditure and out of pocket expenditure. Having public
insurance decreases the likelihood of having non-zero emergency room out of pocket costs. Having
private insurance increases the likelihood of having non-zero o ce based visits and inpatient hospital
stays out of pocket expenditures. Having public insurance decreases the likelihood of having o ce
based visits out of pocket costs. Being insured increases the overall expenditure, but decreases out
of pocket costs where significant results are found.
4.2 Control Function
Using the control function approach shows that having private insurance makes one 26.2 percentage
points (p < 0.01) more likely to have non-zero total expenditure. With this approach, significant
results are not found for the second stage or overall. Having public insurance makes 26.4 percentage
points (p < 0.01) more likely to have non-zero total expenditure. Significant results are not found
for the second stage or overall e↵ects.
An individual with private insurance is 18.5 percentage points (p < 0.05) more likely to have
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non-zero out of pocket expenditure, and significant results are not found for the second stage or
overall e↵ect. Having public insurance shows a second stage e↵ect of a decrease of $1388.9 (p <
0.05) and a decrease of $793.0 (p < 0.05) overall e↵ect.
The e↵ect of having private insurance shows a decrease of 17.2 percentage points (p < 0.05)
in the likelihood of having a non-zero emergency room self/family amount. The control function
approach does not give significant second stage or overall e↵ects. The e↵ects of having public
insurance on the emergency room self/family amount are not significant.
The e↵ect of having private insurance on the o ce based visits self/family amount is a 35.3
percentage point (p < 0.001) increase in the likelihood of having non-zero expenditure in that
category. The second stage and overall e↵ect of the two-part model do not give significant results.
Having public insurance gives a first stage result of a decrease of 11.7 percentage points (p < 0.05)
with the control function approach, but significant results are not found for the second stage or
overall e↵ect.
Using the control function approach, relative to being uninsured, having insurance makes one
more likely to have non-zero total expenditure. Being privately insured increases the likelihood
of having non-zero total out of pocket and o ce based visits out of pocket expenditures, and
decreases the likelihood of having emergency room out of pocket expenditures. Being publicly
insured decreases the amount paid for total out of pocket expenditures.
5 Conclusion
Using the approach in this paper, the e↵ect of having insurance on healthcare expenditures is
undetermined. Being insured has mixed e↵ects on expenditure. The results between the naive
model and control function model are not entirely consistent. The control function method results
are theoretically more accurate, however it is di cult to parse out endogenous e↵ects. F-tests show
that the residuals added in the control function approach are significant, which further supports
the control function method.
The results from this paper show that persons that are insured are more likely to have non-
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zero expenditure overall (for both privately and publicly insured) and out of pocket (for privately
insured) relative to the uninsured. However this paper cannot distinguish whether these changes
are due to moral hazard or are due to the shift in demand due to the lower cost for medical services.
Unlike Finkelstein et al. (2012), which was unable to reject the null that emergency room utilization
was unchanged, this paper finds that having private insurance makes one less likely to have non-
zero out of pocket emergency room expenditure. The results from this study suggest that insured
persons have higher health expenditures overall, which is consistent with findings from Cardon and
Hendel (2001). However, this cannot be used to suggest that health insurance does not provide a
benefit to the insured as it fails to account for any possible benefits from consumption smoothing
and long term health e↵ects.
This paper is limited by sample size and the high percentage of persons with zero expenditure.
Further research with a larger sample size may be able to more accurately capture endogenous
e↵ects.
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6 Tables
Table 1: Sample Size by ACA Expansion Status and Age
Pre-Implementation Post-Implementation
2008-2010 2011-2012
Control
26-29 5,254 3,961
Treatment
21-25 6,465 4,999
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Expenditures
mean sd count
Health Care Expenditure 1974.832 14307.439 19157
Amount Paid by Self/Family 330.214 980.455 19157
ER Amount Paid by Self/Family 25.443 231.675 19157
O ce Based Visits Paid by Self/Family 93.197 414.839 19157
Inpatient Hospital Stays Paid by Self/Family 30.752 494.897 19157
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Independent Variables
mean sd count
Health Insurance Coverage Indicator 1.709 0.885 19157
Treatment Group 0.500 0.500 19157
Interaction 0.205 0.404 19157
2009 0.199 0.399 19157
2010 0.201 0.401 19157
2011 0.209 0.407 19157
2012 0.201 0.401 19157
Age 25.236 2.563 19157
Female 0.499 0.500 19157
Marital Status 0.174 0.379 19157
Black 0.142 0.349 19157
Asian 0.051 0.221 19157
Hispanic 0.208 0.406 19157
Log of Family Income 10.211 1.971 19157
Years of Education 13.155 2.282 19157
ADL Screener 1.996 0.062 19157
IADL Screener 1.990 0.100 19157
Census Region 2.679 1.029 19157
MSA 0.870 0.336 19157
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Table 4: Age Demographics of Persons in Sample
Pre-Policy Post-Policy
2008-2010 2011-2012
21 1342 1027
22 1268 977
23 1307 967
24 1297 994
25 1251 1034
26 1344 1002
27 1279 1018
28 1303 931
29 1328 1010
Observations 11719 8960
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Table 5: Multinomial Logit Model
Private Public Only
Treatment Group 1.420** 1.203
(0.173) (0.180)
Interaction 1.478*** 1.174
(0.162) (0.160)
Female 1.347*** 4.794***
(0.082) (0.387)
Married 1.736*** 1.168
(0.128) (0.114)
Black 0.610*** 1.833***
(0.049) (0.180)
Asian 0.581*** 0.796
(0.073) (0.167)
Hispanic 0.346*** 0.702***
(0.025) (0.072)
Log of Family Income 1.319*** 0.923***
(0.039) (0.011)
Years of Education 1.498*** 0.893***
(0.027) (0.016)
ADL Screener 1.766 1.924
(1.399) (1.639)
IADL Screener 2.220 12.026***
(0.967) (4.974)
Region 1.010 0.712***
(0.033) (0.031)
MSA 1.076 0.909
(0.106) (0.109)
cons 0.001*** 3.356***
(0.000) (1.049)
N 19157
Exponentiated coe cients; Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 6: E↵ects of Insurance on Total Health Expenditure and Total Out-of-Pocket Expenditures
Naive Control Function
Logit GLM TPM Logit GLM TPM
Total Expenditure
Private 0.220⇤⇤⇤ 1053.2⇤⇤⇤ 1119.7⇤⇤⇤ 0.262⇤⇤ -64.96 594.9
(18.59) (5.53) (8.51) (3.24) (-0.05) (0.75)
Public 0.243⇤⇤⇤ 3154.5⇤⇤⇤ 2793.5⇤⇤⇤ 0.264⇤⇤ 319.2 882.3
(17.33) (5.33) (5.78) (3.27) (0.20) (0.86)
Observations 19157 12469 19157 19157 12469 19157
Total Out-of-pocket Expenditure
Private 0.202⇤⇤⇤ -186.5⇤⇤⇤ 1.224 0.185⇤ -917.4 -423.8
(16.21) (-3.96) (0.05) (2.27) (-1.27) (-1.03)
Public 0.0599⇤⇤⇤ -321.5⇤⇤⇤ -131.1⇤⇤⇤ -0.109 -1388.9⇤ -793.0⇤
(3.68) (-5.61) (-4.47) (-1.22) (-2.07) (-2.06)
Observations 19157 10846 19157 19157 10846 19157
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 7: E↵ects of Insurance on Health Expenditures
Naive Control Function
Logit GLM TPM Logit GLM TPM
Emergency Room Out-of-Pocket Expenditure
Private -0.00326 -286.8⇤⇤⇤ -20.43⇤⇤⇤ -0.172⇤ 181.0 -34.30
(-0.49) (-4.17) (-3.68) (-2.11) (0.40) (-0.81)
Public -0.0281⇤⇤⇤ -284.9⇤⇤⇤ -27.83⇤⇤⇤ -0.134 129.7 -23.95
(-3.87) (-3.36) (-4.77) (-1.66) (0.28) (-0.59)
Observations 19157 1139 19157 19157 1139 19157
O ce Based Visits Out-of-Pocket Expenditure
Private 0.210⇤⇤⇤ -99.20⇤⇤ 13.00 0.353⇤⇤⇤ -688.9 -75.23
(16.75) (-3.03) (1.34) (4.91) (-1.01) (-0.61)
Public -0.0703⇤⇤⇤ -66.37 -32.54⇤ -0.117⇤ -625.5 -137.8
(-4.59) (-1.11) (-2.48) (-2.15) (-1.03) (-1.26)
Observations 19157 6512 19157 19157 6512 19157
Inpatient Hospital Stays Out-of-Pocket Amount
Private 0.0124⇤⇤⇤ -509.5 11.54 0.0495 -21171.7 1136.9
(4.26) (-1.25) (1.23) (1.53) (-0.46) (0.38)
Public 0.00889 -508.6 6.215 0.00265 -32728.7 -728.8
(1.96) (-0.91) (0.44) (0.26) (-0.56) (-0.45)
Observations 19157 469 19157 19157 469 19157
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Figure 1: Uninsured Rates in Sample
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Figure 2: Mean Total Expenditure by Age
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Figure 3: Mean Out-of-Pocket Expenditures by Age
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Figure 4: Mean Out-of-Pocket Expenditures by Year
25
